Title Page

  • Site conducted

  • Conducted on

  • Prepared by

Loss of Separation (Airprox)

T - Conflicting Military and/or Non-radio Traffic

  • Avoid active military route / areas

E - Military Activity Areas

  • Use of TCAS by Military

  • Military participation and compliance with Delta Ops Procedures

  • Conflicting civil traffic compliance with Delta Operators Procedures

E - Lack of awareness of changes to Delta Ops

  • Eastwind Aviation attends Delta Ops meetings

  • Delta Ops - Communication Plan

  • Flight Crew detects conflicting military aircraft through Visual Obs or RT SA

E - Military Combat Operations

  • VMC ops only

  • Safety Stand-down - All aircraft Land / RTB

  • Active transponder on conflicting 'non radio' traffic

  • Flight Crew detects incorrect position of other aircraft through TCAS derived SA

T - Conflicting Commercial Traffic

  • Positive Radar Identification (at LOS and DNPO (PH Int'l))

  • No Positive Radar Identification (Below 1500') (at Warri and other Delta areas)

  • Airworks Advisory Information - Southern Sector & Delta

  • Conflicting civil traffic compliance with Delta Operators Procedures

E - Lack of awareness of changes to Delta Ops

  • Eastwind Aviation attends Delta Ops meetings

  • Delta Ops - Communication Plan

  • Flight Crew detects conflicting aircraft through Visual Obs or RT SA

  • Flight Crew detects incorrect position of other aircraft through TCAS derived SA

T - Loss of SA

  • Flight Crew clear understanding of existing procedures in the area

E - Lack of awareness of existing procedures

  • Route / Area Line Training

  • Flight Crew adhere to sterile cockpit SOPs

  • Flight Crew have a correct shared mental picture via approach briefing

E - Inappropriate use of automation

  • FCOM / OEM Derived Automation Policy

  • Training in 'Use of Automation'

  • Conflicting civil traffic compliance with Delta Operators Procedures

  • Flight crew detects conflicting aircraft through Visual Obs or RT SA

  • Flight crew detects incorrect position of other aircraft through TCAS derived SA

T - Incorrect or misunderstood ATC instructions

  • ATC issuing understandable instructions using standard phraseology

E - Comprehension and understanding

  • Use and understanding of English

  • Routinely copying down key ATC instructions

  • Flight crew use of CRM to confirm shared mental picture

  • Flight Crew request clarification from ATC

  • ATC detecting and recognising an error during read-back

  • ATC/ Airworks/ HLO detecting and recognising conflicting traffic; which is not following advice.

  • Flt Crew maintains traffic SA and challenge ATC /HLO

T - Flight Crew do not correctly manage aircraft to maintain clearance

  • Flight Crew accurately enter clearance/ instructions into FMS/ instrumentation

E - Flight Crew errors during data input

  • Aircraft Systems - Design highlights errors/ differences

  • Flight Crew detect, recognise and correct error via crosscheck SOPs

  • Use of fully updated NAV data

  • Managing and Monitoring Flight Path

E - Degraded flight crew monitoring due to complacency, distraction or fatigue

  • Monitoring & Communications skills included in CRM

  • Flight & Duty Time Limitations

  • Fatigue Risk Management System (FRMS)

  • Adherence to SOPs that define monitoring roles and callouts

  • Flight Crew adherence to sterile cockpit SOPs

E - Inappropriate manual handling of aircraft

  • FCOM or OEM based automation policy for appropriate use of manual handling

  • ATC/ Airworks/ HLO detecting and recognising conflicting traffic; which is not following advice.

T - Release of an Unairworthy Aircraft to Service

  • See - Continuing Airworthiness / MCM - Release of an Unairworthy Aircraft to Service BowTie

  • See - Maintenance / AMO PM - Release of an Unairworthy Aircraft to Service BowTie

Section Break - Top Event - Loss of Separation (Airprox)

C - Ineffective BowTie / HRM

  • QA Mgnt System - Threat Line Audit

C - Mid-air Collision

  • HLO/ATC recognise the incursion and issues avoiding action

  • Flight Crew of both aircraft receiving TCAS RA

  • Flight Crew responds appropriately to instructions and/ or TCAS RA

  • Flight Crew of either aircraft detects and recognizes the conflict and takes emergency avoiding action

C - Abrupt avoidance manoeuvre resulting in injuries

  • Flight Crew responds appropriately to LoCI (above)

  • Aircraft protection systems limit certain manoeuvres (e.g.TQ_limiter)

  • Cabin secured for flight by SOPs

  • Cabin design features to minimise injuries (e.g FAK strapped down)

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